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BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OKLAHOMA CITY v
DOWELL: PROTECTION OF LOCAL
AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD FOR THE
PURPOSE OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION?
The United States Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law to
all citizens.' The Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[n]o state shall
make or enforce any law which shall deny . .. to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."2 For fifty-eight years, the
United States Supreme Court interpreted this amendment to mean that
when substantially equal facilities are provided for both races, the races are
treated equally, even if the facilities are separate.3
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I),4 however, the Supreme Court
explicitly overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine, holding separate edu-
cational facilities in public schools unequal, and therefore unconstitutional.5
The Court looked to the effect of segregation on public education and found
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Id The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting all
state-imposed discrimination against the African American race. See In re Slaughter-House
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 67-72 (1873) (holding that the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to establish the freedom of the African American race, to protect that race from further op-
pression, and to forbid laws that discriminate against African Americans as a class); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880).
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483 (1954), established the "separate but equal" doctrine and became the controlling
authority for segregation in public education. See Joseph S. Ransmeier, The Fourteenth
Amendment and the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 50 MICH. L. REV. 203, 204 n. 11(1951).
Plessy v. Ferguson involved a Louisiana state act, passed in 1890, that mandated separate rail-
road coaches for Caucasions and African Americans. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540. Plessy, 7/8
Caucasian and 1/8 African American, was an intrastate railroad passenger who refused to
move from the "white" coach when a conductor instructed him to do so. Id. at 541-42. After
police arrested Plessy, he challenged the statute's constitutionality. Id. at 542. The Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the state law, using a Fourteenth Amendment analysis,
id. at 550-52, in what has been called an intellectually frail decision. See Ransmeier, supra, at
214.
Courts applied the rule of Plessy v. Ferguson in a wide variety of cases during the years
following the landmark decision. See Ransmeier, supra, at 215. Courts applied the Plessy
"separate but equal" doctrine to interstate passenger travel, id., to real estate, id. at 220, to
marriage, id. at 223, and, most significantly for the purposes of this article, to public education.
Id. at 216. Plessy was the law until 1954 when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), declared the "separate but equal" doctrine unconstitutional.
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 495.
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segregated schools unequal because they generate a feeling of racial inferi-
ority in African American children. 6 Although the Supreme Court has es-
tablished specific guidelines to implement its decision in Brown I, it has
consistently looked to the effect of segregation before ordering a remedy.7 In
recent years, the courts have addressed the problem of when to terminate a
desegregation remedy.' In particular, standards for determining when a de-
segregation remedy has achieved its purpose have generated conflicting re-
sults among United States courts of appeal decisions.' The central issue in
this conflict is whether a court should apply the federal law of injunctive
remedies in dissolving a school desegregation decree.
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell,"0 the
Court considered whether a district court could dissolve a desegregation de-
cree if local authorities operated in compliance with the decree for a reason-
able period of time. ' The decree was a result of a 1961 suit which arose
when African American students and their parents sued the Board of Educa-
tion of Oklahoma City Public Schools to end de jure segregation 12 in the
public schools.' 3 In 1963, the district court found that Oklahoma City was
operating a "dual" school system-one intentionally segregated by race-
and that previously, it had intentionally segregated both schools and hous-
ing.14 In 1965, the district court held that the school board's use of neigh-
borhood zoning failed to remedy past segregation because one-race schools
still existed as a result of residential segregation. 5 In 1972, the United
6. Id. at 494.
7. See infra notes 46-43 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 144-69 and accompanying text.
9. See id.
10. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
11. Id. at 633.
12. "Dejure segregation" is "segregation directly intended or mandated by law or other-
wise issuing from an official racial classification or in other words.., segregation which has or
had the sanction of law." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 425 (6th ed. 1990). Dejure segregation
indicates "any situation in which the activities of school authorities have had a racially dis-
criminatory impact contributing to the establishment or continuation of a dual system of
schools." Id. In contrast, "de facto segregation" refers to "that which is inadvertent and
without the assistance or collusion of school authorities." Id. Keyes v. School Dis. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189 (1973), defined "dejure segregation" as a "current condition of segregation resulting
from intentional state action." Id. at 205.
13. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633.
14. Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
15. Dowell v. School Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Schools, 244 F. Supp. 971, 975 (W.D. Okla.
1965), aff'd, Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 375 F.2d 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 931
(1967). Oklahoma City had once enforced residential segregation, and it still remained, even
though not state-enforced, because of discrimination by some realtors and financial institu-
tions. Dowell, 244 F. Supp. at 975. The district court found that segregated schools were the
cause of some housing segregation. Id. at 976-77.
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States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma ordered a deseg-
regation plan that necessitated extensive busing.1 6 At the school board's re-
quest, the court later terminated its supervision of the decree." In 1977, the
district court held that the school district had achieved "unitary" status, 8
16. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Schools, 338 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D.
Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972). Under this plan,
called the "Finger Plan":
kindergart[]ners would be assigned to neighborhood schools unless their parents
opted otherwise; children in grades 1-4 would attend formerly all white schools, and
thus black children would be bused to those schools; children in grade five would
attend formerly all black schools, and thus white children would be bused to those
schools; students in the upper grades would be bused to various areas in order to
maintain integrated schools; and in integrated neighborhoods there would be stand-
alone schools for all grades.
Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, I l I S. Ct. at 633.
The "Finger Plan" was "a court-ordered desegregation plan prepared by Dr. John A. Fin-
ger, Jr., a Professor of Education at Rhode Island College and an authority on issues of school
desegregation." Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 890 F.2d 1483, 1486 (10th Cir. 1989),
rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
17. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634. See Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub.
Schools, No. Civ-9452 (W.D. Okla., Jan. 18, 1977); App. 174-76. The school board made a
"Motion to Close Case" in 1977 after complying with the desegregation decree for five years.
Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633-34. In its "Order Terminating Case," the district court held:
The Court has concluded that [the Finger Plan] worked and that substantial compli-
ance with the constitutional requirements has been achieved. The School Board,
under the oversight of the Court, has operated the Plan properly, and the Court does
not foresee that the termination of its jurisdiction will result in the dismantlement of
the Plan or any affirmative action by the defendant to undermine the unitary system
so slowly and painfully accomplished over the 16 years during which the cause has
been pending before this court....
Id. at 633-34 (quoting Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Schools, No. Civ-9452
(W.D. Okla., Jan. 18, 1977); App. 174-76).
18. Courts have failed to adopt a universal definition for the term "unitary." Dennis G.
Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 41, 58 (1986).
However, the Eleventh Circuit in Georgia State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775
F.2d 1403 (1 th Cir. 1985), drew a distinction between a "unitary school system" as "one
which has not operated segregated schools as proscribed by cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education and Green v. County School Board for a period of several
years," and a school system which has achieved "unitary status" as "one which is not only
unitary but has eliminated the vestiges of its prior discrimination and has been adjudicated as
such through the proper judicial procedures." Id. at 1413 n. 12. See Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 635-
36; see also Terez, supra, at 57 n.70.
The Georgia State Conference court admitted that other courts have confused these two
terms. Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1413 n.12. In fact, the Fifth Circuit proposed a
different definition, holding that a unitary school district is one "in which schools are not
identifiable by race and students and faculty are assigned in a manner that eliminates the
vestiges of past segregation." United States v. Lawrence County School Dist., 799 F.2d 1031,
1034 (5th Cir. 1986). The Fifth Circuit then identified unitary schools as those which are fully
integrated. Id. at 1038.
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and as a result, the plaintiffs did not appeal.' 9
In 1985, African American students and their parents challenged the
school system's plan of neighborhood school assignments as a return to seg-
regation.2" The district court initially refused to open the case, but the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded
the case.2 On remand, the district court vacated the previous injunctive
decree and returned the school district to local control.22 The court of ap-
peals again reversed, holding that an injunctive decree remains in effect until
a school district can show "grievous wrong evoked by new and unforeseen
conditions. '2 3 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to re-
solve the conflict between the Tenth Circuit's standard of using the federal
law of injunctive decrees to dissolve a desegregation decree, and the more
lenient standard of using traditional equitable principles applied by both the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.2 4
The Supreme Court, rejecting the Tenth Circuit's more stringent stan-
dard, reversed the court of appeals' decision and held that the proper stan-
dard for determining the dissolution of a desegregation decree is whether the
decree has achieved the purposes of desegregation.25 Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority,2 6 considered the allocation of powers within
19. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 633-34.
20. Id. at 634. The school board had adopted the Student Reassignment Plan (SRP)
which, beginning with the 1985-86 school year, assigned students in grades kindergarten
through four to neighborhood schools. Students in grades five through twelve continued to be
bused. However, "[u]nder the SRP, 11 of 64 elementary schools would be greater than 90%
black, 22 would be greater than 90% white plus other minorities, and 31 would be racially
mixed." Id.
21. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Schools, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
22. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 634-35. See Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub.
Schools, 677 F. Supp. 1503, 1526 (W.D. Okla. 1987), vacated, Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the
Okla. City Pub. Schools, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989).
23. Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Schools, 890 F.2d 1483, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
24. Dowell, 110 S. Ct. at 1521; see Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1483 (reasoning that the standard
for modification of a desegregation decree is the federal law on injunctive remedies); Spangler
v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that a district court
must use equitable principles to determine when it can terminate a desegregation decree); Rid-
dick v. School Bd. of the City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1986) (following Spangler, the
court used equitable principles to determine when a desegregation decree could be terminated).
See also infra notes 144-69 and accompanying text.
25. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636. The Court was divided with five Justices joining in the
majority opinion, and three Justices dissenting. Id. at 632-33.
26. The Chief Justice was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id.
at 632-33.
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the federal system27 and found that courts should use a different standard in
school desegregation cases.2" The Court explained that since it has always
intended a desegregation decree to be a temporary measure to remedy past
discrimination,29 a federal court's control of a school system should not last
longer than the time necessary to correct the effects of past intentional dis-
crimination.3" The Chief Justice concluded that the district court should
consider whether a school board had complied in good faith with the deseg-
regation decree since it was imposed as well as whether the "vestiges of past
discrimination" had been eliminated to the extent practicable.3"
In a forceful dissent, Justice Marshall rejected the majority's test, which
focused on demonstrating present and future compliance with the desegrega-
tion decree,32 stating that the test ignores the persistent effects of the past
discrimination.33 Instead, the dissent asserted, because the Court previously
used the "stigmatic injury" associated with segregated schools34 as the cen-
tral focus in establishing a desegregation decree,3 - the Court should also use
the stigmatic injury requirement in dissolving a decree.36 Further, Justice
Marshall concluded that a "racially identifiable school" is a correctable con-
dition which is likely to inflict stigmatic injury, and therefore, the Court
should not lift a decree if this condition persists.
37
This Note explains Supreme Court decisions judging the adequacy of
school desegregation remedies employed by school districts and judicial
treatment of desegregation remedies. This Note first examines the Supreme
Court's holding in Brown I that segregation in public education is unconsti-
tutional, and the policies that accompanied Brown I, which courts have in-
corporated into desegregation doctrine ever since. This Note then presents
the guidelines that the Court established for district courts to follow when
awarding relief in desegregation cases. Next, this Note presents conflicting
lower court decisions which have interpreted the Supreme Court's standards
for establishing desegregation remedies. This Note then analyzes the major-
ity and dissenting opinions in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v.
27. Id. at 637.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir.
1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
31. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
32. Id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 642.
34. Id. at 643.
35. See Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
36. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 643-44.
37. Id. at 639.
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Dowell. The Note observes that the Court, by formulating a standard for the
dissolution of a desegregation decree without considering the stigmatic in-
jury that segregation inflicts on African American children, ignored the pur-
pose of desegregation precedent. This Note suggests that Dowell gives little
guidance to lower courts in constructing a standard to dissolve a desegrega-
tion decree. This Note acknowledges that although subsequent decisions
have clarified the Supreme Court Justices' opinions on the lifting of a school
desegregation decree, the Court's position still remains ambiguous. This
Note concludes that the Court in Dowell should have taken into account the
stigmatic injury that both state-imposed segregation, and the effects of segre-
gation after the state ceases to enforce segregation, inflicts on African Amer-
ican children.
I. THE ORIGINS OF DESEGREGATION LAW
A. The Abolition of "Separate But Equal"
The Supreme Court's unanimous decision in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown I),3" declaring the doctrine of "separate but equal" unconstitutional,
was the starting point for a major change in American race relations and is
consequently considered one of the most important events in recent United
States history.3 9 In Brown I, the Court held that segregation of children in
public schools on the basis of race generates a feeling of inferiority in African
American children and therefore, is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.' Brown I arose when African
American children from four different states4 brought a class action suit
38. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
39. RAYMOND WOLTERS, THE BURDEN OF BROWN: THIRTY YEARS OF SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION 3 (1984). See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ch. 16 (2d ed. 1988) (providing background on the law of school desegregation remedies);
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 14 (4th ed. 1991)
(same); WILLIAM D. VALENTE, EDUCATION LAW, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ch. 17 (1985) (dis-
cussing school desegregation remedies); William L. Taylor, Brown, Equal Protection, and the
Isolation of the Poor, 95 YALE L.J. 1700, 1709-12 (1986) (providing overview of school deseg-
regation cases).
40. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494-95. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. But see Her-
bert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 34
(1959):
[I]f the freedom of association is denied by segregation, integration forces an associa-
tion upon those for whom it is unplehsant or repugnant .... Given a situation where
the state must practically choose between denying the association to those individu-
als who wish it or imposing it on those who would avoid it, is there a basis ... for
holding that the Constitution demands that the claims for association should prevail?
Id. at 34.
41. The cases originated in Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware.
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after they were refused admission to schools established under state laws
which mandated or allowed local districts to mandate racial segregation.4 2
The Court reasoned that an examination of the circumstances surround-
ing the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was inconclusive in deter-
mining this case because there was so little information relating to the
amendment's intended effect on public education. 43 Instead, the Court fo-
cused on the effect of segregation on public education, and concluded that
42. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 486-88. For example, Topeka, Kansas maintained a segregated
public school system in accordance with Chapter 72-1724 of the General Statutes of Kansas,
1949. Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797, 797 (D. Kan. 1951), rev'd, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). This statute authorized "cities of the first class" to establish and maintain separate
schools for white and African American children in grades below high school. Id
The district courts in three of the cases, Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951), Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), vacated, 342 U.S. 350 (1952), and
Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), rev'd, Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), denied relief to the African American children on the so-called
"separate but equal" doctrine. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 688. See supra note 3 and accompanying
text. In the fourth case, Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137 (Del.), cert. granted, 344 U.S. 891
(1952), aff'd, Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), the Supreme Court of Delaware
used the same doctrine, but granted the African American children admission to the segre-
gated white schools because they were superior to the schools that the children were presently
attending. Gebhart, 91 A.2d at 152. The court held that the unequal facilities provided to
African American students violated their rights to equal protection of the laws under the "sep-
arate but equal" interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 139. In considering the
substantial equality or inequality of educational facilities, the court compared public funds,
buildings, sites, accreditation, curriculum, faculty and instruction, equipment and instructional
materials, libraries, physical and mental health and nursing services, extra-curricular activities,
and transportation to the two schools of the white schools and the African American schools.
Id at 142-52.
43. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 489-90. The Court in Brown I noted that the status of public
education at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was far less than its status
in 1954, the date of the opinion. Chief Justice Warren in Brown I also examined how the
Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at 490-92. Chief Justice War-
ren recognized that the first cases decided after the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption prohib-
ited all state-imposed discrimination against African Americans. Id. at 490. See supra note 2
and accompanying text. Next, Justice Warren noted that the Court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ.
(Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), with the "separate but equal" doctrine, but Plessy did not
involve education. Id. at 490-91. Chief Justice Warren acknowledged that although the Court
had decided six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in public education, the
legitimacy of the doctrine itself had not been challenged directly. Id. at 491-92. See, e.g.,
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (holding that a segregated African American law school
could not provide equal educational opportunities); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for
Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (requiring that an African American admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students). Here, however, in distinguishing Brown I
from these earlier cases, Justice Warren stated that the question of the legitimacy of the doc-
trine was directly presented. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492.
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separate educational facilities are not equal.' The Court acknowledged the
complexity involved in formulating an injunctive decree in this situation and
then scheduled the case for reargument on the question of appropriate
relief.45
One year later, the Court announced its decision on the issue of appropri-
ate relief for the desegregation of public schools in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (Brown H).46 First, Chief Justice Warren delegated authority to fashion
relief to the courts, which originally heard the cases, because of their famili-
arity with local conditions.47 Next, the Court addressed the public and pri-
vate considerations involved and held that in forming injunctive decrees,
44. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 492-95. The Court recognized the importance of education to
the American democratic society, and reasoned that where the state has undertaken to provide
this significant opportunity, it must be available to all children on equal terms. Id at 492-93.
Chief Justice Warren clearly stated that "[t]o separate [African American children] from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferi-
ority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone." Id. at 494 (citing psychological studies at n.11). Therefore, in
refraining from discussing the issue of whether segregation violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the Court held that
"[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," id. at 495, because they deprive chil-
dren of equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id.
In criticizing the Brown I opinion, one commentator has claimed that Brown I is not about
racial inferiority. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUC-
TION OF THE LAW 76 (1990). Judge Bork criticized Brown P's holding as "disingenuous"
because the Court relied on the stigmatic injury of African American children to prove the
unconstitutionality of segregation. Id. at 75. Judge Bork reasoned that the real rationale for
Brown was deeper, and that it had nothing to do with the context of education or the infliction
of stigma. Id. at 76. Judge Bork attributed the Brown I decision to the Warren Court's ability
to make political decisions because it had the support of a political constituency. Id. at 77. See
supra note 43 and accompanying text. By asserting that Brown I is not about racial inferiority,
Judge Bork implies that the Court indicated that Brown I was about racial inferiority. This is
not so. The sense of inferiority that is a result of legalized segregation was one of the reasons
why Brown I held that separate educational facilities were unequal. See Brown I, 347 U.S. at
492-95.
45. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495-96. The parties were requested to address questions four and
five previously propounded by the Court. Id. at 495, n.13. In question four, the Court asked
whether, within limits, a desegregation decree should allow African American children to be
admitted to schools of their choice or whether the Court could allow a gradual adjustment to
be brought about from a segregated school system to a desegregated school system. Id. The
Court, in question five, asked: (a) whether the Court should formulate detailed decrees;
(b) what specific issues the decrees should reach; (c) whether the Court should appoint a
special master; and (d) whether the Court should remand these cases to the courts of first
instance to frame decrees, what general directions these decrees should include, and what pro-
cedures the courts of first instance should follow in framing the specific terms of the decrees.
Id.
46. 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
47. Id. at 299. The primary inquiry of the district courts in this situation was to deter-
mine whether the action of school authorities in solving a variety of local problems "consti-
tutes good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles." Id.
[Vol. 41:779
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these courts were to use traditional equitable principles.4" In addition, the
Court instructed the lower courts to require school authorities to make a
"prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance" with the ruling in
Brown I, but gave the lower courts authority to grant additional time if nec-
essary.4 9 However, Brown II placed the burden on school authorities to es-
tablish that they are complying with Brown I in good faith.50 Brown II
stated that the district courts were to retain jurisdiction of the cases during
the period of transition to a nondiscriminatory school system.51 Brown II
concluded with extreme imprecision that the lower courts were to assure
that this transition was taking place "with all deliberate speed."52 Brown I
and Brown II encountered strong public hostility and resistance in the
South," a and the Court's vague "with all deliberate speed" requirement gave
little guidance to the lower courts enforcing desegregation.54 Finally, in a
unanimous opinion in Cooper v. Aaron,55 the Court reaffirmed its commit-
48. The Court noted that equitable principles were appropriate for use in this type of
situation because traditionally they have allowed for flexibility in shaping remedies and easy
adjustment and reconciliation with public and private needs. Id at 300. Here, the Court
reasoned, the personal interest of African American children is at stake in gaining admission to
public schools as soon as possible and without discrimination. Id. The Court, however, recog-
nized that there may be obstacles to the effectuation of this personal interest. Id The Court
allowed the district courts to effectively eliminate these obstacles while taking into account the
public interest, but emphasized that the courts must strongly enforce the constitutional princi-
ples involved, even if there is disagreement with them. Id
49. Id at 300.
50. Id Toward this end, the Court allowed the lower courts to consider a number of
administration problems stemming from physical conditions of schools, transportation, per-
sonnel, revision of school districts and attendance areas, and revision of local laws and regula-
tions. Id In addition, lower courts were given the power to evaluate the adequacy of any
plans that school authorities may propose "to effectuate a transition to a racially nondiscrimi-
natory school system." Id. at 301.
51. Id. at 301.
52. Id Brown I's "with all deliberate speed" standard has been noted for its ambiguity.
TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-18, at 1489. See Robert B. McKay, 'With All Deliberate Speed': A
Study of School Desegregation, 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 991 (1956).
The Court's rejection of petitioner's request for immediate relief in favor of the "all
deliberate speed" approach engendered severe criticism. See, e.g., R. Carter, The
Warren Court: A CriticalAnalysis 46, 52-57 (R. Sayler, B. Boyer, & R. Gooding, eds.
1969). It has been reported that the "all deliberate speed" standard was worked into
the amicus brief of the United States by a former law clerk of Justice Frankfurter in
response to that Justice's privately expressed concerns about putting together a ma-
jority in Brown.
TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-18, at 1489 n.9 (citing Philip Elman & Norman Silber, The Solicitor
General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History,
100 HARV. L. Rv. 817, 827-30 (1987)).
53. See TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-18, at 1489; DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW 381 n.15 (1980).
54. See TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-18, at 1489.
55. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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ment to the Brown I decision and clarified the meaning of the "with all delib-
erate speed"5 6 requirement enunciated in Brown JJ.57 The Court held that a
federal district court could not allow an Arkansas school board to postpone
its school desegregation program for two and one-half years."8 In Cooper,
the school board requested postponement of its plan when the Governor of
Arkansas dispatched units of the Arkansas National Guard to prevent
school desegregation at a local high school.5 ' The district court granted the
board's request for delay in implementing the relief,' and the court of ap-
peals reversed." The Court reasoned that a school board could not have
legally complied in good faith in attempting to vindicate the rights of Afri-
can American children if other state officials blocked its efforts.6 2
B. The Supreme Court Mandates Immediate Action
Thirteen years after the Court first enunciated its ambiguous "with all
deliberate speed" requirement in Brown II, the Supreme Court in Green v.
County School Board6" demanded that a school board establish a proposed
desegregation plan that will show immediate progress toward dismantling
state-imposed segregation." In Green, a class action was brought to chal-
lenge a Virginia school board's maintenance of a "freedom of choice" plan.65
The Court first recognized that the system's schools were racially identifiable
56. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
57. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 7.
58. Id. at 13-14. The Court found that state officials had contributed to segregated condi-
tions and therefore, the school board could not assert its own good faith as an excuse for the
delay in implementing desegregation. Id. at 15-16.
59. Id. at 9-10. The Governor took this action in anticipation of the widespread opposi-
tion that implementing the first stage of the desegregation plan would cause. Id. Supposedly,
the Governor did this without any request by school authorities. Id. at 9. The Arkansas
National Guard was withdrawn only after federal troops intervened. Id. at 12.
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id. at 14-16.
63. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
64. Id. at 438-39. Before this decision, "Congress had demonstrated its own concern with
the lack of progress in school desegregation by enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including
provisions to deal with the problem through various federal agencies." TRIBE, supra note 39,
§ 16-18, at 1490 n.21. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified
as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a - 1975d, 2000a - 2000h-6 (1988)).
65. Green, 391 U.S. at 431-32. The school board operated one white combined elemen-
tary and high school (New Kent) and one African American combined elementary and high
school (George W. Watkins). Id. at 432. Under the "freedom of choice" plan, students in
both first grade and eighth grade had to affirmatively choose to attend either the New Kent
School or the Watkins School. Id. at 433-34. Each year, students in any other grade had the
option to choose which of the two schools to attend, and any student who did not make a
choice was assigned to the school he or she previously attended. Id.
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as to the student bodies, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activi-
ties and facilities, precisely what Brown I declared unconstitutional and
Brown H sought to abolish." Next, in evaluating the substantive require-
ments of the "freedom of choice" plan, the Court noted that it was relevant
that this plan was not even enacted until eleven years after Brown I was
decided and ten years after Brown H demanded a start toward desegrega-
tion.6 7 The Court then instructed the district courts that a desegregation
plan provides effective relief if a school board is acting in good faith, if the
plan is capable of dismantling segregation, and if the plan will work "at the
earliest practicable date."6 The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the
"freedom of choice" plan in Green because it did not effectively desegre-
gate.69 The Court, however, cautiously provided that its holding did not
preclude the use of "freedom of choice" plans in the future if they would
serve effectively.7'
C. The Supreme Court Establishes Specific Guidelines
After Green, the law remained unclear as to how school authorities and
district courts were to comply with the mandates of Brown L.' The
Supreme Court's decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
cation 72 attempted to establish guidelines that more precisely defined tech-
66. Id. at 435. The Court reasoned that "a plan that at this late date fails to provide
meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system is... intolera-
ble." Id at 438.
67. Id at 438. The Court noted that "[t]his deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitu-
tional dual system can only have compounded the harm of such a system. Such delays are no
longer tolerable ...." Id.
68. Id. at 439.
69. Id. at 441. The Court remarked:
In three years of operation not a single white child has chosen to attend Watkins
school and although 115 Negro children enrolled in New Kent school in 1967 (up
from 35 in 1965 and Ill in 1966) 85% of the Negro children in the system still
attend the all-Negro Watkins school. In other words, the school system remains a
dual system.
Id
The Court in Green noted that in the view of the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
in order for a freedom of choice desegregation plan to be effective, both African American and
white parents and students need to act affirmatively. Id at 440 n.5. The Court neither en-
dorsed nor rejected the following factors which were said to contribute to the ineffectiveness of
a freedom of choice plan: fear of hostility from the white community, fear of violence or
harassment, public officials' wrongly deterring African American families from sending their
children to white schools, poverty (and consequently embarrassment because of clothing) of
African American families, and improvements in facilities in all-African American schools.
Id.
70. Id. at 440-41.
71. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971).
72. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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niques to achieve a desegregated school system.7 3 In Swann, the petitioner
challenged the appropriateness of a desegregation plan approved by the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina.7 4
The Supreme Court reviewed the district court's desegregation decree and
upheld its proposed remedy. 75 First, the Court held that a board of educa-
tion could use mathematical ratios of the racial composition of a school as a
guideline in shaping a desegregation remedy.76 Next, the Court held that
the district court must closely scrutinize the existence of one-race or
predominantly one-race schools within a school system when fashioning a
remedial process of desegregation. 77 Third, Swann established that in order
to form a desegregation remedy, a district court may alter attendance zones
to achieve a nondiscriminatory result.78 Finally, the Court ruled that local
school authorities may use bus transportation as a tool of desegregation. 79
D. School Desegregation in the North
Following Swann, the issue remained whether the same standards would
be applied in the context of Northern school desegregation.8 0 In Keyes v.
73. See id. at 14.
74. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970),
aff'd in part, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
75. Swann, 402 U.S. at 31-32.
76. Id. at 25. The district court had directed "that efforts should be made to reach a 71-
29 ratio in the various schools so that there will be no basis for contending that one school is
racially different from the others." Swann, 311 F. Supp. at 267-68.
77. Swann, 402 U.S. at 22, 25-26. The district court's decree also stated "[tlhat no school
[should] be operated with an all black or predominantly black student body." Swann, 311 F.
Supp. at 268.
78. Swann, 402 U.S. at 28. The Court stated that "[tihe maps submitted in these cases
graphically demonstrate that one of the principal tools employed by school planners and by
courts to break up the dual school system has been a frank-and sometimes drastic-gerryman-
dering of school districts and attendance zones." Id. at 27. In addition, Swann endorsed
"pairing" of schools, a "'clustering,' or 'grouping' of schools with attendance assignments
made deliberately to accomplish the transfer of Negro students out of formerly segregated
Negro schools and transfer of white students to formerly all-Negro schools." Id. at 27. The
Court held that the establishment of noncontiguous school zones, even to the extent that the
zones are located on opposite ends of the city, was permissible because of the broad remedial
powers of a district court. Id. The Court provided that the desegregation remedy may even be
awkward and inconvenient if it was effective in eliminating dual school systems. Id. at 28.
The Court also warned the district courts not to rely solely on maps to determine the distance
between school zones, because these zones may often be more accessible to each other than
they appear. Id. at 29.
79. Id. at 30. Swann recognized possible objections to transporting students by bus "when
the time or distance of travel is so great as to either risk the health of the children or signifi-
cantly impinge on the educational process." Id at 30-31. However, the Court noted that in
this case, the district court's decree called for students to be picked up on streets close to their
homes, with bus trips lasting not more than thirty-five minutes. Id. at 30.
80. BELL, supra note 53, § 7.4.4, at 393.
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School District No. I,"1 the Supreme Court addressed school desegregation in
the North in Denver, 2 where the public school system had never operated
under an explicit constitutional or statutory provision which mandated or
allowed racial segregation.8 3 First, the Supreme Court held that where
plaintiffs prove that school authorities implemented a segregative policy in a
significant portion of a school system, this will support a finding that a dual
system exists."4 Further, the Court found that the burden to prove lack of
intent to segregate on the part of school authorities then shifts to those au-
thorities.8 5 Lastly, the Court determined that if the school board cannot
prove lack of segregative intent, then the board can rebut the presumption
that a school system is segregated only by showing that its acts did not "cre-
ate or contribute" to the segregated condition of the schools.8 6 In Keyes, the
Court consistently applied in the North the school desegregation standards
that it had already established, even without a finding of dejure segregation
in every part of a school system.
II. DESEGREGATION REMEDIES FOUND INADEQUATE BY THE COURT
A. The Trend of Judicial Restraint
One year after Keyes, the Supreme Court decided Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken 1),87 and overruled a district court's desegregation decree only
three years after the Court upheld the broad remedial power given to the
federal district courts in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
81. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
82. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-18, at 1492.
83. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 191. Rather, the school board alone had manipulated student at-
tendance zones, strategically selected school sites, and maintained a neighborhood school pol-
icy to further the existence of segregated schools throughout the school district. Id.
84. Id. at 201. The Court based its conclusion on three factors: first, that structuring
segregative attendance zones to create a high percentage of African Americans in one school
has the reciprocal effect of populating other schools with mostly white students, id. at 201;
second, that building one segregated school will in turn directly affect the racial composition of
other schools, id.; and third, that racially identifiable schools combined with student assign-
ments and the construction of new schools could have a reciprocal effect on the actual makeup
of residential neighborhoods. Id. at 202.
85. Id. at 208.
86. Id. at 211.
87. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). Milliken I exemplifies the difficulty in constructing adequate
remedies in civil rights cases. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1495.
[I]n a school desegregation case [as opposed to a traditional lawsuit], the remedy
takes the form of a judicial decree restructuring an institution and, often, establishing
a continuing regime of oversight. Myriad particular circumstances must be taken
into account by the district judge in framing the affirmative injunction, thereby dras-
tically expanding the discretionary component of the relief.
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tion.88 The Supreme Court in Milliken I addressed the question of whether
a district court could impose a multidistrict desegregation remedy if segrega-
tion existed in only a single school district.89 The district court in Milliken I
found that a school board's proposed desegregation plan' would make a
Detroit school system even more one-race and would drive the urban white
population further away from the city.9" Consequently, the district court
ordered the school board to implement a desegregation remedy in a metro-
politan area that included fifty-three suburban Detroit school districts.92
The Supreme Court, with four justices dissenting,93 held that the district
court's order for an interdistrict remedy was not constitutionally required.94
The Court, unwilling to expand the existing scope of a desegregation rem-
edy, determined that because the suburban districts had not committed any
constitutional violation, they could not have a desegregation plan imposed
upon them.95
Approximately two years later, the Supreme Court decided Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler.96 In Spangler, the Court held that a district
88. 402 U.S. 1 (1971); TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1495; See RICHARD DIMOND,
BEYOND BUSING: INSIDE THE CHALLENGE TO URBAN SEGREGATION (1985).
89. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 721.
90. Of the three Detroit-only desegregation plans submitted by the city Board and the
respondents, the Board supported the "Magnet Plan," because it used a superior curriculum to
attract students. Id. at 723, 732.
91. Id at 732.
92. Id. at 733.
93. Id. at 757 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id at 762 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 781 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan joined in both Justice White's and Marshall's dissent.
94. Id at 752.
95. Id. at 752-53. Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion admitted that "an interdistrict
remedy might be in order where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts
caused racial segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately
drawn on the basis of race." Id at 745. Cf Justice Stewart's concurring opinion. Id. at 755
(stating that an interdistrict remedy might be proper if state officials had contributed to racial
segregation).
The 5-4 split in Milliken I is representative of the Justices' disagreement concerning the
purpose of school desegregation. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1494 n.9. The dissenters in
Milliken I, Justices Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, and White, interpreted the statement in
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971), that "[t]he district judge or
school authorities should make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual
desegregation," id. at 26, to mean "that school authorities must, to the extent possible, take all
practicable steps to ensure that Negro and white children in fact go to school together." Milli-
ken I, 418 U.S. at 802 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Yet, the majority opinion understood the
Swann statement to mean that "the remedy is necessarily designed, as all remedies are, to
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct." Id. at 746 (emphasis added). See TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at
1494 n.9. The goal of one faction is the elimination of remaining effects of segregation, while
the goal of the other faction is to provide the victims of segregation with make-whole relief.
96. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
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court could not compel a school board to annually readjust its attendance
zones to prevent the existence of a "majority of any minority""" race in any
public school if the school board had previously established a racially neu-
tral system of student assignment.9 The Court examined the district court's
continued jurisdiction to monitor student assignments against excerpts from
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education."" The Court then
found that a district court could not ensure that an appropriate racial mix
was "maintained in perpetuity."'" 0 Therefore, the trend of increasing re-
straint in the school desegregation area continued, in contrast to earlier de-
segregation cases that allowed the district court broad equitable authority to
eliminate segregation.' 0 '
B. The Trend of Judicial Restraint Continues
Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton I)102 represented the
continued reluctance of the Supreme Court to endorse a district court's
sweeping desegregation remedy.0 3 In Dayton I, the district court concluded
that a school board's failure to eradicate schools with a substantial racial
imbalance in a school district,"° a school board's use of optional attendance
zones, '0 5 and a school board's retraction of previous desegregation efforts"6
were a "cumulative violation"'0 7 of the Equal Protection Clause. 08 The
97. Id. at 435.
98. Id. at 434-35.
99. Id at 433-37.
100. Id at 436; but see Justice Marshall's dissenting opinion. Id. at 441-44 (Marshall, J.
dissenting).
101. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1495-96.
102. 433 U.S. 406 (1977).
103. See TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1497-98 (noting that "[s]chool integration cases
decided in the wake of Washington v. Davis [426 U.S. 229 (1976)] at first appeared to continue
the trend of retrenchment begun in Milliken I").
104. The district court concluded that most of the sixty-six Dayton, Ohio Public Schools
"were imbalanced and that, with one exception," the school board had not tried to remedy this
situation. Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 412.
105. The Court defined "optional zone" as "an area between two attendance zones, the
student residents of which are free to choose which of the two schools they wish to attend."
Id at 412 n.8.
106. The Court noted that a newly-elected school board rescinded resolutions that called
for remedial measures. Id. at 413.
107. Id The Court criticized the district court for its ambiguous phrase "cumulative viola-
tion." Id The Court interpreted the district court's phrase to mean that "there were three
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Court then imposed a system-wide desegregation remedy.'0 9 The court of
appeals affirmed." 0
The Court emphasized that because of the conflict in prior Supreme Court
cases between federal courts' authority to grant relief in a desegregation case
when a school board has violated the Constitution and the tradition of local
autonomy of school districts,"' if federal judicial oversight is going to re-
place local oversight, a constitutional violation must be proven and legally
justified." 2 The United States Supreme Court decided unanimously" 3 to
vacate the decision of the court of appeals and remand the case for further
proceedings." 4 Next, the Court enunciated a three-part inquiry for the dis-
trict court and court of appeals to use in a case where legal segregation is no
longer enforced." 5 The Court determined that in order for the district court
to impose its remedy, there must be a showing that the school board in-
tended segregative actions." 6 If it did, courts must find out how much seg-
regation this caused in Dayton compared to how much segregation would
have existed if the board had not acted." 7 Finally, the Court noted that the
remedy must be tailored to redress that difference."'
On the same day as Dayton I, the United States Supreme Court held in
Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken ii),'"' that a federal district court could order
remedial education programs as part of a school desegregation decree, and
ordered a state to contribute to the cost of those programs.' 20 First, the
Court decided that the nature and scope of the constitutional violation deter-
mines the type of remedy.' 2 In addition, the Court noted that the remedy
must return the victims of segregation to the position they were in before the
school board's conduct.' 2 Finally, the Court held that lower courts must
consider the need for state and local authorities to manage their own af-
fairs.' 23 In Milliken II, the district court's four educational components to
109. Id.
110. Id. at 416.
111. Id. at 410.
112. Id.
113. Justice Marshall took no part in the case. Id at 421.
114. Id. The Court imposed this requirement because of its holding in Washington v. Da-
vis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (holding that there must be an intent to discriminate for a law to be
declared violative of equal protection). See TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1498.
115. Dayton I, 433 U.S. at 420.
116. Id. at 413, 420.
117. Id. at 414, 420.
118. Id. at 420.
119. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
120. See id. at 286-88.
121. Id. at 280.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 280-81.
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the decree included a remedial reading and communications skills program,
a comprehensive in-service teacher training program, a non-biased student
testing program, and a student counseling and career guidance program.
1 24
The Supreme Court determined that these programs were necessary to cor-
rect the effects of past discrimination from a de jure segregated school
system.
25
The United States courts of appeals continued to support the Swann-Keyes
principle.' 2 6 However, during the Supreme Court's 1978-1979 term, there
was concern that limitations would be imposed on this principle. 27 In Au-
gust of 1978, Justice Rehnquist granted a stay to the Columbus, Ohio Board
of Education for the implementation of its desegregation plan.' 28 When the
Court heard Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton 11)129 and
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick (Penick II),13 however, the Court
approved the desegregation plans because the Court found much evidence of
past discrimination.' 3 '
Because of the pervasive consequences of the segregated school system
and the segregative impact of the school board's practices, the Supreme
Court, in a 5-4 Dayton H decision, 132 affirmed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit's ruling that upheld a system-wide remedy.
133
The Court held that since the school board had operated a dual school sys-
tem, it had to dismantle that system and eliminate all its segregative ef-
fects. 134 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that plaintiffs must prove
124. Id. at 275-76.
125. Id. at 287.
126. See BELL, supra note 53, at 406. See also supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text.
127. See BELL, supra note 53, at 406.
128. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick (Penick 1), 439 U.S. 1348 (1978). To justify the
stay, Justice Rehnquist cited burdens that the desegregation order would impose on the school
system and the likelihood that the Court would soon grant a writ of certiorari to hear the case.
Id. at 1352-53.
129. 443 U.S. 526 (Dayton I) (1979).
130. 443 U.S. 449 (Penick 11) (1979).
131. See Dayton 11, 443 U.S. at 535-37; Penick 11, 443 U.S. at 475 n.8; see also BELL, supra
note 53, at 406.
132. 443 U.S. 526 (Daytonll) (1979).
133. Id. at 534.
134. Id. The Court explained that the school board had used optional attendance zones
and maintained all-African American faculties during the 1930s and 1940s, as well as at the
time of Brown I. Id. at 535. Specifically, the Court noted that in 1950, "the faculty at 100%
black schools was 100% black and [ ] the faculty at all other schools was 100% white." Id.
Because this situation existed in 1954, the Court reasoned that the board had responsibility to
eliminate the effects of the segregation and that the board's actions would be judged by their
effectiveness. Id. at 537-38.
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that each individual act of discrimination has a specific effect on current
patterns of segregation. 1
35
On the same day that it heard Dayton /, the Court decided Columbus
Board of Education v. Penick (Penick II).136 In Penick //, the Court noted
that the operation of separate African American schools in Columbus, Ohio
in 1954 was the direct result of school officials' acts.1 37 Because of this, the
Court reasoned, the school board had a duty to dismantle its dual system. 1
3
Next, the Court recognized that certain board actions revealed the board's
purpose to segregate according to race. 139 Finally, the Court concluded that
a desegregation remedy should be appropriate for the constitutional viola-
tion involved, and here, evidence of system-wide impact of the board's segre-
gative policies justified the district court's imposition of a system-wide
remedy. 4°
The remedies that the Supreme Court has found acceptable in desegrega-
tion cases vary according to the shifting majorities of the Court that have
heard these cases.' 4 Because of this, it is extremely difficult to reason from
the requirement of a racially balanced school system as established in Brown
135. Id. at 540-41.
136. 443 U.S. 449 (Penick II) (1979).
137. Id. at 456. The Court evaluated the school system in 1954 because that was the year
that Brown I was decided. Id.
138. Id at 458. The Court stated that each time the board failed to dismantle its system, it
was continuing to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 459.
139. Id. at 461-62. The Court cited the board's practice of assigning African American
teachers to African American schools, its use of optional attendance zones, discontiguous at-
tendance areas, boundary changes, and its selection of sites for new schools. Id
140. Id at 466-67. As evidence of system-wide impact, the Court noted the board's pre-
1954 policy of creating Afro-American schools, its post-1954 failure to desegregate, its segre-
gative school construction policy, its student assignment policy, and its practice of assigning
Afro-American faculty to Afro American schools. Id at 467. To support its conclusion, the
Court, referencing Keyes, stated that "purposeful discrimination in a substantial part of a
school system furnishes a sufficient basis for an inferential finding of a systemwide discrimina-
tory intent unless otherwise rebutted." Id at 467.
141. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1499. For example, in Penick II, the majority con-
tained the same Justices as the majority in Dayton II (although Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tice Stewart concurred). Id. at 1499 n.52. In Penick II, although Columbus, Ohio had not had
statutorily-mandated segregation in this century, Justice White found a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment. See Penick II, 443 U.S. at 464-65; TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1499.
The Court in Penick II stated that it was applying the rationale of Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,
413 U.S. 189 (1973). Dissenting in Penick II, however, Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Court had relaxed the Keyes standards for imposing a systemwide remedy based on inferred
causal links between the practices of the School Board and the racial balance of the schools.
See Penick II, 443 U.S. at 490-91, 500-01, 506-07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also TRIBE,
supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1499.
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H 142 to what is to be included in the components of a desegregation decree
in a particular case.
143
III. LOWER COURTS DISAGREE AS TO THE STANDARD FOR REMOVAL
OF A DESEGREGATION DECREE
The inconsistent rationale used by the Supreme Court to evaluate school
desegregation remedies 1" resulted in conflicting circuit court decisions re-
garding the correct standard to apply in judging the appropriateness of a
desegregation decree when a school system argues that its system is no
longer discriminatory. 4 5 The first standard, adopted by both the Ninth Cir-
cuit in Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education'46 and the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Riddick v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 147 evaluated a
desegregation decree using traditional equitable principles. 4 ' The second
standard was adopted by the Tenth Circuit in Dowell v. Board of Education
of Oklahoma City '49 and applied the established "grievous wrong" standard
for modification of a federal injunctive decree.'5 °
A. The Standard of the Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit
Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education ... held that a district court
must relinquish its jurisdiction over a school board's desegregation decree
and used the three factors established in Milliken I12 to determine the
appropriate remedy.' 53 The court reasoned that in using equitable princi-
ples,' 4 the district court should first consider the nature and scope of the
constitutional violation.' 5 ' Second, the district court should restore the vic-
tims of discrimination to the position they would have been in if there was
142. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955).
143. See Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 4, 50-51 (1982) (noting that because the Court must form a prospective and affirma-
tive remedy in public law litigation, the trial judge has much discretion, and consequently,
there is less of a connection between the "right" asserted and the remedy).
144. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
145. See Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 11l S. Ct. 630 (1991).
146. 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
147. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
148. Id. at 537.
149. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
150. Id. at 1490.
151. 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979).
152. 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977). See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
153. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241.
154. Id. See supra notes 48, 122-24 and accompanying text.
155. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241.
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no illegal conduct. 156 Third, the district court must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs. 157 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that after nine years' 58 of court supervision, all
three requirements were satisfied.' 59
Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk also addressed the issue of
whether judicial involvement ends when a school system achieves unitary
status." ° The Fourth Circuit required a plaintiff to prove that a school
board acted with discriminatory intent in order for a court to compel a rem-
edy to counteract resegregation of a school system. 16 ' Following the Ninth
Circuit's opinion in Spangler,162 Riddick held that without proof of a school
board's deliberate intent to discriminate, further supervision by a district
court is not necessary.
163
B. The Tenth Circuit Adopts a More Exacting Standard
In Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City,' the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld a more stringent standard for
determining when a district court can terminate a desegregation decree, rea-
soning that the modification of a desegregation decree must be evaluated
using the federal law on injunctive remedies. 165 The court determined that a
156. Id. Initially, the court noted that the school board's eight year compliance with the
"1970 Pasadena Plan" was sufficient to meet the first two factors. Id.
157. Id. Emphasizing the temporary nature of a desegregation decree, the court criticized
the district court for not considering the board's present and future compliance with the deseg-
regation decree. Id. at 1241.
158. Id. at 1244.
159. Id. at 1241. The court, approving the modified decree, remanded the case to the dis-
trict court with an order to terminate the case. Id. at 1242.
160. 784 F.2d 521, 534 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
161. Id. at 536-37. Cf Davis v. East. Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1435
(5th Cir. 1983); Ross v. Houston Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1983).
162. Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1239. The court reasoned that the district court must consider
the nature and scope of the constitutional violation, and concluded that in Norfolk, the pres-
ence of one-race schools is not itself a violation of the Constitution because the school board
did not show an intent to discriminate. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 537, 543. Next, the court deter-
mined that Norfolk's neighborhood assignment plan was sufficient to provide victims of segre-
gation with whole relief. Id. Finally, the court explained that the school board, if it has
eliminated dejure segregation, will be allowed to run its schools without federal court supervi-
sion if it has not shown an intent to discriminate. Id.
163. 784 F.2d at 537, 543.
164. 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 630 (1991).
165. Id. at 1485-86. The standard for modification of an injunction was first articulated in
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). See Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490. In Swift,
the United States Supreme Court held that only "a clear showing of grievous wrong evoked by
new and unforeseen conditions" should lead a court to change an injunction decree entered by
consent. Swift, 286 U.S. at 119. Defendants in Swift, the five leading meat packers in the
United States, filed a petition to modify a consent decree, id. at 113, enjoining them to dissolve
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school desegregation injunction is essentially the same as any other injunc-
tive order issued by a federal court, and that all parties must comply with
the decree until it is modified by the court that first issued it.' For modifi-
cation of a desegregation decree, the court demanded that the school board
show dramatic changes had occurred from conditions unforeseen at the time
of the decree.' 67 In addition, the school board must show that these condi-
tions now render the decree ineffective in protecting the rights of the decree's
beneficiary and that the decree imposes extreme hardships on the school
board. 6" The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Dowell to determine the
a monopoly. Id. at 110-11. The Supreme Court acknowledged the power of a court of equity
to modify an injunction because of changed conditions, id. at 114, but established that the
court must inquire "whether the changes [that have occurred] are so important that dangers,
once substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow" before modification. Id. at 119.
In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968), the Court interpreted the
holding in Swift to mean that "a decree may be changed upon an appropriate showing, and...
that it may not be changed in the interests of the defendants if the purposes of the litigation as
incorporated in the decree.., have not been fully achieved." Id. at 248. See 11 CHARLES
WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2961, at 602-03
(1973). In addition, the Supreme Court has held that the parties' expressed intent to comply
with the injunction itself cannot become the basis for modification or dissolution of an injunc-
tion. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953).
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992), the Supreme Court made it
even easier for state and local officials to obtain a change in a federal court desegregation
decree by rejecting completely the application of the Swift "grievous wrong" standard. Id. at
758. The Court adopted a more flexible two-pronged inquiry for modification of an institu-
tional reform consent decree: whether there has been a significant "change in fact or in law"
and whether the modification is "suitably tailored to the changed circumstance." Id. at 763.
Although the Court's ruling pertained to prison reform, the standard that the Court con-
structed was applicable to other institutional reform litigation as well, including school deseg-
regation decrees. Id. at 758-59.
166. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1486. In Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies,
Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941), Justice Frankfurter described an injunction as being "'permanent'
only for the temporary period for which it may last. It is justified only by the violence that
induced it and only so long as it counteracts a continuing intimidation. Familiar equity proce-
dure assures opportunity for modifying or vacating an injunction when its continuance is no
longer warranted." Id. at 298.
167. Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490.
168. Id. at 1490.
Placed in other words, this means for us that modification is only cautiously to be
granted; that some change is not enough; that the dangers which the decree was
meant to foreclose must almost have disappeared; that hardship and oppression, ex-
treme and unexpected, are significant; and that the movants' task is to provide close
to an unanswerable case. To repeat: caution, substantial change, unforeseenness,
oppressive hardship, and a clear showing are the requirements.
Dowell, 890 F.2d at 1490 (quoting Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. American Oil Co., 405 F.2d 803,
813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 905 (1969)). FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (b) codifies this standard.
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appropriate standard to use in determining when a district court may termi-
nate a desegregation decree.
169
IV. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF OKLAHOMA CITY v. DOWELL: A
FURTHER EXTENSION OF THE TREND OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
A. The Majority: Misinterpreting the Aim of School Desegregation
Precedents
1. Preliminary Questions
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell,17° the United States
Supreme Court established a flexible standard for district courts to use when
determining when to dissolve a desegregation decree so as to show deference
to local government control of education. 7' In Dowell, the Court first ad-
dressed whether respondents could challenge the district court's 1987 disso-
lution of the injunction that had imposed the desegregation decree.172 The
Board of Education of Oklahoma City argued that the 1977 district court
order finding that the school system had achieved unitary status terminated
the litigation, and therefore precluded Dowell from later contesting the 1987
order that had dissolved the decree. 17 3 The Court disagreed that Dowell
was barred from this action, first, because the 1977 order did not dissolve the
desegregation decree, and second, because the district court's 1977 finding of
a unitary school system was too ambiguous as to the meaning of the word
"unitary."' 174 Although the Court noted that lower courts were not consis-
169. Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 635 (1991); see Dowell v.
Board of Educ. of Okla. City, 890 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1989) (reasoning that the standard for
modification of a desegregation decree is the federal law on injunctive remedies), rev'd, 111 S.
Ct. 630 (1991); Spangler v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding
that a district court must use equitable principles to determine when it can terminate a deseg-
regation decree); Riddick v. School Bd. of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) (following Spangler, the court used equitable principles to deter-
mine when a desegregation decree could be terminated); see also supra notes 144-69 and ac-
companying text.
170. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
171. Id. at 637, 639.
172. Id. at 635. In 1987, the district court decided to lift the injunctive decree and return
the school district to local control. Id.
173. Id. In 1977, the district court held, in its unpublished "Order Terminating Case,"
that "[j]urisdiction in this case is terminated ipso facto subject only to final disposition of any
case now pending on appeal." Id. at 634.
174. The Court acknowledged that some courts have used the term "unitary" to refer to "a
school district that has completely remedied all vestiges of past discrimination." Id. at 635
(citing United States v. Overton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1987); Riddick v. School Bd. of
City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 533-34 (4th Cir. 1986); Vaughns v. Board of Educ. of Prince
George's County, 758 F.2d 983, 988 (4th Cir. 1985)). According to this interpretation, a uni-
tary school district has met the requirements of Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown I), 349 U.S.
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tent in their use of the word "unitary, ' " the Court refused to give the
words "dual" and "unitary" significance as if they were located in the Four-
teenth Amendment.' 7 6 The Court did not attempt to define these two words
more precisely. 177 The Court accepted the conclusion of the court of appeals
that the 1977 order of the district court did not render the Oklahoma City
school litigation res judicata. 1
7 1
2. The Majority's Standard
The Court found that the court of appeals mistakenly relied on language
from prior case law when it held that a district court could lift or modify a
desegregation decree only if there was a showing of "grievous wrong evoked
by new and unforeseen conditions."' 1 9 The Court also determined that the
court of appeals erred when it held that a court cannot modify or dissolve an
injunction solely based on a school district's compliance with a decree.'" 0
First, the Court rejected the lower courts' rigid application of the "grievous
wrong" standard for modifying injunctive decrees, and instead restricted this
standard to the specific area of trade restraints. 8' The Court, however, then
294 (1955), and Green v. New Kent County School Bd. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Dowell, III S.
Ct. at 635. However, the Court noted that other courts have used "unitary" to identify "any
school district that has currently desegregated student assignments, whether or not that status
is solely the result of a court-imposed desegregation plan." Id. (citing Dowell v. Board of
Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schools, 890 F.2d 1483, 1491-92 n.15 (10th Cir. 1989)). These courts
still consider a school district unitary even if a school district contained vestiges of past dis-
crimination. Id. See Georgia State Conf. of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403,
1413 n. 12 (11 th Cir. 1985) (explaining that a school district is "unitary" if it has not operated
segregated schools for several years, but a district has achieved "unitary status" only when it
"has eliminated the vestiges of its prior discrimination and has been adjudicated as such
through the proper judicial procedures." Id. at 1413 n. 12).
175. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
176. Id The Court found only that courts have used "dual" to describe a school system
that has intentionally segregated its students by race, and "unitary" to identify a school system
that has complied with the Constitution. Id.
177. Id. The Court first looked to prior case law to decide whether a school board must be
informed of its obligations under a desegregation decree. Id. (citing Pasadena City Bd. of
Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)). From this, the Court reasoned that if the decree will
be terminated or dissolved, then the Court must notify both Dowell and the school board. Id.
178. Id (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)).
179. Id
180. Id (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
181. Id The Court reasoned that prior case law constrained the language in United States
v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932), to the context of the continuing danger of unlawful
restraints on trade. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636 (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 391 U.S. 244 (1968)). The Court noted that in Swift, meat-packing companies initially
agreed to never enter the grocery business, but later attempted to frustrate operation of the
decree. Id. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992); see also supra
note 166.
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used language from prior case law which interpreted the "grievous wrong"
standard from Swift to mean that "a decree may be changed upon an appro-
priate showing, and... it holds that it may not be changed... if the pur-
poses of the litigation as incorporated in the dcree ... have not been fully
achieved." '182 The Court then applied this standard to the facts of Dowell.
The Court reasoned that if the district court found that the Oklahoma City
School District currently operated in compliance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that it was not likely that the
school board would revert to enforced segregation, then the district court
could find that the desegregation decree's purposes had been fully
achieved.
183
The Court supported this analysis without addressing the entire body of
prior desegregation law.' 84 Using select language from prior desegregation
cases, the Court reasoned that federal court supervision of local school sys-
tems was never intended to provide more than a temporary method to rem-
edy past discrimination.' 85 The Court quotes only nineteen words from
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown i), 86 to lend further credibility to the
proposition that federal court decrees were imposed to effectuate a "transi-
tion" away from segregated schools. 187 The Court noted again that desegre-
gation decrees were not intended to operate forever, unlike the injunctive
decree at issue in Swft.'88 Citing prior case law, the Court emphasized that
a desegregation decree is proper only when it directly addresses and relates
to a constitutional violation."8 9 Therefore, the majority reasoned that con-
cerns of federalism support its view that a court should dissolve a desegrega-
tion decree when local authorities have complied with it for a "reasonable
period of time."' 90
182. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636 (citing United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S.
244 (1968)).
183. Id. The majority in Dowell, however, does not explain how the district court should
make this determination.
184. See id. at 644 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
185. Id. The Court mentioned that local control over a school system allowed for citizen
participation and creativity in designing school programs. Id.
186. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
187. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637. The Court noted that Brown H considered the "complexi-
ties arising from the transition to a system of public education freed of racial discrimination"
when it held that desegregation was to proceed "with all deliberate speed." Id. (citing Brown
II, 349 U.S. at 299-301 (emphasis added)). In addition, the Court indicated that Green v. New
Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968), also mentioned the "transition to a unitary,
nonracial system of public education." Id. (emphasis added).
188. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
189. Id. (citing Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267 (1977)).
190. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637. The majority does not specifically define how long a "rea-
sonable period of time" should last other than to indicate that it is the "time required to
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The Court departed from the court of appeals' "Draconian result" of
"condemn[ing] a school district ... to judicial tutelage for the indefinite
future"' "9 when it indicated that a school board's compliance with previous
court orders was relevant in deciding whether to modify or dissolve a deseg-
regation decree. 92 Accordingly, the Court found that neither the principles
of injunctive decrees nor the Equal Protection Clause precluded courts from
considering the school board's compliance with the decree when deciding
whether to dissolve or modify the decree.' 93
Finally, the Court remanded the case to the district court 9 4 to de-
cide whether the school board demonstrated sufficient compliance with
the Constitution as of 1985, when the Student Reassignment Plan
(SRP) was adopted'"g to allow the desegregation decree to be dis-
remedy the effects of past intentional discrimination." Id (quoting Spangler v. Pasadena City
Bd. of Educ., 611 F.2d 1239, 1245 n.5 (9th Cir. 1979) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
The majority narrows its inquiry for the imposition of a desegregation decree to whether
local authorities are in violation of the Constitution, and then allows the dissolution of that
decree when the school system has remedied the effects of past intentional discrimination. Id.
The majority however, makes no reference to the transformation of public attitudes toward the
racial character of the schools. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 196 (1973)
(defining the word segregated to include "the community ... attitudes toward the school").
Perhaps an entire generation of sustained compliance with a decree is needed to accomplish
this goal. See Paul Gerwitz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective
Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 728, 793 (1986). See also Spangler, 611 F.2d at 1241 (as amended
on denial of rehearing) (concluding that eight years is sufficient); Steele v. Board of Pub. In-
struction, 448 F.2d 767, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that three years may be enough);
Singleton v. Jackson Mun. Separate School Dist., 541 F. Supp. 904, 914-15 (S.D. Miss. 1981)
(10 years); United States v. Corinth Mun. Separate School Dist., 414 F. Supp. 1336, 1339-40,
1345 (N.D. Miss. 1976) (five years).
191. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
192. Id. at 637-38. The Court acknowledged that in Oklahoma City, the courts made a
finding of dejure segregation in 1961, the injunctive decree was entered in 1972, and the Board
complied with the decree until 1985. Id. In discussing the benefits of taking the school board's
compliance into account, the Court noted that the composition of school boards change over
time and that a district court has an opportunity to observe the school board's behavior in
accordance with the decree over time. Id.
193. Id. at 638. The Court distinguished the case that the court of appeals relied on for its
statement that "compliance alone cannot become the basis for modifying or dissolving an in-
junction." Id. at 637 (quoting Dowell v. Board of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schools, 890 F.2d
1483, 1491 (10th Cir. 1989)). The Court explained that United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 633 (1953), involved the issue of whether an injunction should be issued, and not
whether an injunction should be dissolved. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
194. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638.
195. In 1985, Dowell filed a motion arguing that the school district had not achieved "uni-
tary" status and that implementation of the SRP was a return to segregation. Id. at 634. The
SRP assigned students in grades kindergarten through fourth grade to neighborhood schools
beginning in the 1985-86 school year, but continued to bus students in grades five through
twelve. Id. In addition, any student was allowed to transfer to a school where he or she would
be in the minority. Id. However, under the SRP, while 31 of 64 elementary schools would be
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solved.' 96 The Court reasoned that the district court should address
whether the school board had complied with the desegregation decree and
whether vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated "to the extent
practicable."' 97 In searching for vestiges of de jure segregation, the Court
directed the district court to look to the six factors that the Court in Green v.
New Kent County School Board '98 determined were the most indicative of
segregated schools: student assignments, faculty, staff, transportation, extra-
curricular activities, and facilities.' 99 The majority concluded that if the
board was entitled to have the desegregation decree terminated, it could then
promulgate policies and rules concerning such matters as student assign-
ments without court authorization.2 'o However, the majority was careful to
provide that the school board's actions must still comply with the Equal
Protection Clause.20 '
B. The Dissent: A Clear Interpretation of the Aim of School
Desegregation Precedents
Justice Marshall's dissent rejected the Court's interpretation of when a
desegregation decree should be dissolved.20 2 The dissent argued that the
Court did not evaluate accurately whether the purposes of the desegregation
decree had been achieved because it failed to consider that the threatened
reemergence of one-race schools is a "vestige" of dejure segregation. 20 3 Jus-
tice Marshall focused more appropriately on the central purpose of school
desegregation precedent: eliminating the stigmatizing harm that state-segre-
gated schools impose on African American children. 2°
racially mixed, 11 of these schools would be more than 90 percent African American, and 22
would be greater than 90 percent white plus other minorities. Id
196. Id. at 638.
197. Id. The Court briefly mentioned in a footnote that the district court's finding that
"present residential segregation in Oklahoma City was the result of private decisionmaking
and economics, and that it was too attenuated to be a vestige of former school segregation"
would be treated as res nova on further consideration of the case. Id. at 638 n.2. The Court
provided no further analysis of this proposition.
198. 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
199. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 638 (quoting Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S.
430, 435 (1968), and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971)).
See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
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1. Dissent's Standard for Determining Whether a Desegregation Decree
Should be Dissolved
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that the proper standard for
determining whether a district court should dissolve a school desegregation
decree is whether the school system has fully achieved the purposes of the
desegregation litigation as contained in the decree.2"5 However, the dissent
strongly opposed the majority's opinion of what a school board must show
to demonstrate that it has fully achieved the goals of a desegregation de-
cree.2°" Justice Marshall asserted that a standard for dissolving a desegrega-
tion decree must take into account the unique harm associated with
segregated schools and must require the elimination of these schools. 207
Justice Marshall first emphasized that the Court, since its decision in
Brown I,20 has used remedying and avoiding the recurrence of stigmatizing
injury as guiding objectives when formulating relief in a desegregation
case.2"9 The dissent asserted that the Court has used stigma to inform its
standard to determine the effectiveness of a desegregation remedy, 210 to ex-
plain its requirement that a school district provide its victims of segregated
205. Id. at 641 (citing the majority opinion in Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 636; United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S.
244, 248 (1968); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 436-37 (1976); Span-
gler, 427 U.S. at 444 (Marshall, J., dissenting)). Justice Marshall also agreed with the majority
that before a school desegregation decree is dissolved, the district court must give a precise
statement of how the standards for dissolution have beeen met. Id. at 641 n.3.
206. Id. at 639. Justice Marshall contended that the majority's conception of the purposes
of a desegregation decree was not clear. Id. at 642 n.4. Justice Marshall attributed this to the
majority's preoccupation with rejecting the court of appeals' use of the "grievous wrong" lan-
guage from United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932). Dowell, 111 S. Ct at 642 n.4
See also id. at 635 (majority opinion).
207. Id. at 642 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
208. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). See supra note 43-44 and accompanying text. In Brown I,
the Supreme Court first recognized the unique social harm that segregation itself inflicts on
African American children. The Court held that segregated schools generate a long-lasting
feeling of inferiority in African American children relating to their status in the community.
Id. at 494. This feeling of inferiority in turn affects an African American child's motivation to
learn, and consequently has a tendency to retard his or her educational and mental develop-
ment. Id. The Court concluded that segregated schools were inherently unequal. Id. at 495.
209. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 642.
210. Id. Justice Marshall pointed out that in Green v. New Kent County School Bd., the
Court held that a proposed desegregation plan was inadequate because it did not remedy the
effect of segregation in "every facet of school operations." Id. (quoting Green, 391 U.S. 430,
435 (1968)). Justice Marshall further asserted that the Court made it clear in Green that under
the Equal Protection Clause, school boards were obligated to eliminate every indication of
"racially identifiable" schools that will cause the stigmatic injury that Brown I sought to re-
dress. Id. (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 435, and citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)). See supra notes 46-143 and accompanying text.
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schools with "make whole" relief,21' and to explain its demand that reme-
dies provide lasting integration of formerly segregated systems.212 Similarly,
Justice Marshall reasoned that the Court should also make stigmatic injury
central to the standard for dissolving a desegregation decree.2"'
The dissent observed that the end which a desegregation decree seeks to
achieve is the elimination of all vestiges of state-imposed segregation.214
While Justice Marshall conceded that the Court has never clearly defined a
"vestige" of segregation, the dissent suggested a working definition of the
211. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 643. In further examining school desegregation precedent, Jus-
tice Marshall cited Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), for the proposition that a school desegrega-
tion decree must "restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of such conduct." Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 643 (quoting Milliken I,
418 U.S. at 746). Justice Marshall again pointed out that in order to do this, the Court has
held that school districts must remedy any lasting effects of former dejure segregation. Id. at
643 (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 281-88 (1977)). The dissent explained that the relief upheld
in Milliken II was intended to help prevent the stigma on African American children from
turning into a self-perpetuating phenomenon. Id (citing Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 287). See
supra note 122.
212. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 643. Justice Marshall again cited prior case law to support his
argument. He asserted that the Court has found that formerly segregated school districts must
"make every effort to achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation and ... be
concerned with the elimination of one-race schools." Id (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 26)
(emphasis added) (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979); Colum-
bus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460 (Penick II) (1979); Raney v. Board of Educ. of
Gould School Dist., 391 U.S. 443, 449 (1968)). Justice Marshall reasoned that the Court's
focus on "achieving and preserving an integrated school system," id. at 643 (quoting Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 251 n.31 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (emphasis added)), is rooted in the recognition that if racial separation in formerly
segregated schools reemerges, then the message that African American children are racially
inferior may be revived as well. Id. at 643. In addition, Justice Marshall referred to a recent
school desegregation study to point out that many all-African American schools continue to
suffer from high ratios of students to faculty, lower quality teachers, low-grade facilities and
physical conditions, and lesser quality course offerings and extracurricular programs. Id at
643 n.5.
213. Id. at 643-44. For this proposition, Justice Marshall reasoned that the stigmatic in-
jury to African American that accompanies a segregated school system has been central to the
Court's standard for evaluating the development of a desegregation decree. Id. Next, he as-
serted that the Court has also held that the ultimate end to be brought about by such a remedy
is a nonracial system of public education through the elimination of all vestiges of state-im-
posed segregation. Id. at 644 (quoting Green, 391 U.S. at 436 and Swann, 402 U.S. at 15).
Marshall recognized that "vestiges" includes every element of school operations as well as "the
community and administration['s] attitudes toward [a] school." Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting Keyes, 413 U.S. at 196). Consequently, Justice Marshall concluded that avoiding
stigma should be the central aim of the standard for dissolving a desegregation decree as well.
Id. The dissent explained that the majority erred on this point. Id.
214. Id. (quoting Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (1971)).
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concept,2 ' gleaned from the function of the term in earlier jurisprudence.216
Justice Marshall firmly concluded that if "vestiges" of segregation persist in
a school system, then a school system has not accomplished the purposes of
the desegregation decree, and therefore, a court cannot dissolve the
decree.
217
Justice Marshall attacked the majority for establishing a vague and mild
standard for dissolving a desegregation decree.218 Justice Marshall ex-
plained that the majority considered vestiges of segregation eliminated, and
therefore, the purposes of a desegregation decree achieved, as long as a
school board is currently operating and will operate in compliance with the
Equal Protection Clause.219 First, the dissent criticized the ambiguity of this
standard because the majority says very little about the scope or meaning of
the word "vestiges. '2 20 Next, the dissent asserted that the Chief Justice, in
his majority opinion, established a mild standard which ignores how the stig-
matic harm identified in Brown I could exist even after state-enforced segre-
gation has ended.22' On the other hand, Justice Marshall's standard
attributes responsibility for eliminating the remaining effects of segregation
to the school board, in keeping with school desegregation precedent, even if
the board is no longer enforcing segregation. 2 '2 The dissent's inquiry is
whether vestiges capable of inflicting stigmatic harm exist and whether all
that can be done to eliminate them has been done. 23
2. Dissent's Application of its Standard for Dissolution of a
Desegregation Decree
Next, the dissent in Dowell applied the standard that it had formulated
and concluded that it would agree with the court of appeals and order the
district court to restore the desegregation decree to the Oklahoma City Pub-
215. In referring to "vestige," the dissent remarked that "the function that this concept has
performed in our jurisprudence suggests that it extends to any condition that is likely to con-






221. Id. Justice Marshall pointed out that in Green v. New Kent County School Bd., the
Court rejected a freedom-of-choice plan because it anticipated that the choices made would
reflect the message of racial inferiority that originated in the state-enforced segregation of
schools. Id. The dissent acknowledged that a school board's compliance with a desegregation
decree is relevant in considering whether the decree should be dissolved, but there must be a
requirement in the standard for dissolution which would assure a district court that the school
district will continue to operate an integrated school system. Id. at n.6.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 647.
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lic Schools.224 Justice Marshall maintained that removal of the decree
would be untimely because it would result in racially identifiable schools,
precisely what an effective desegregation decree is supposed to abolish.22
The dissent acknowledged that the existence of these schools, when evalu-
ated against the background of former state-imposed segregation, perpetu-
ates the stigmatic injury to African American children associated with
segregation.22 Therefore, Justice Marshall concluded, these schools must
be eliminated whenever it is possible.227
Justice Marshall also criticized the majority opinion for not addressing
how the district court should consider the reemergence of racially identifi-
able schools in dissolving a desegregation decree.228 The dissent found each
argument that the majority asserted to circumvent this issue logically
flawed. 229 First, the dissent confronted the majority's refusal to consider
whether residential segregation in Oklahoma City is a vestige of former
school segregation and then asserted that it is well established that school
segregation may have a profound effect on the racial composition of residen-
tial neighborhoods. 23 ° Next, Justice Marshall attacked the majority's allu-
224. Id. at 648.
225. Id. at 645 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971);
Green v. New Kent County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968); Wright v. Council of the
City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 802-03 (1974) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs of Mobile County, 402 U.S. 33, 37
(1971)).
226. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 645.
227. Id. Justice Marshall pointed out that in Oklahoma City, when the board replaced the
Finger Plan with a system of neighborhood school assignments for grades kindergarten
through four, a system of racially identifiable schools developed. Id. Over one-half of
Oklahoma City's elementary schools under the SRP now have student enrollment that is either
90% African American or 90% non-African American. Id.
228. Id. The majority instructed the district court to consider whether those "'most im-
portant indicia of a segregated system'" have been eliminated, citing only those aspects of
segregated school operations identified in Green-" 'faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curric-
ular activities and facilities'" for guidance. Id. (citing the majority opinion in Dowell, 111 S.
Ct. at 638).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 645 (citing Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 202 (1973); Columbus
Bd. of Educ. v. Penick (Penick I), 443 U.S. 449, 465, n.13 (1979)). The dissent interpreted the
majority opinion to mean that it accepted that vestiges may exist beyond those identified in
Green, at least as a theoretical possibility, when it rendered res nova the issue of whether
residential segregation in Oklahoma City is a vestige of former school segregation. Id. at 638.
See supra text accompanying note 66.
Justice Marshall noted that the Court has held that any injurious condition resulting from
state-enforced segregation must be remedied as much as possible. Id. at 646 n.8 (citing Milli-
ken v. Bradley (Milliken II), 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977)). In Dowell, Marshall asserted, the
record demonstrated that the Board's segregated school policies contributed to residential seg-
regation, and therefore must be eliminated. Id. at 646. The dissent pointed out that as early as
1965, the district court found that the Board's use of neighborhood schools "serve[d] to ...
Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell
sion to the fact that racially identifiable schools could be acceptable if they
resulted from residential segregation perpetuated by "private decisionmak-
ing. '"231 Finally, the dissent rejected the majority's assertion that the district
court should take the length of federal judicial supervision into account in
assessing a dissolution.2 32 Justice Marshall argued that a return to active
supervision of the decree is not required,233 but observed that merely retain-
ing the decree was a slight burden in comparison to the risk of violating
African American children's constitutional rights.2 34
exten[d] areas of all Negro housing, destroying in the process already integrated neighbor-
hoods and thereby increasing the number of segregated schools." Id. (quoting Dowell v.
School Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Schools, 244 F. Supp. 971, 977 (W.D. Okla. 1965)).
231. Id. at 645-47. Justice Marshall criticized the majority because its analysis ignored the
roles of the state, local officials, and the board in creating the self-perpetuating patterns of
residential segregation that now exist in Oklahoma City. Id. at 646. Justice Marshall con-
cluded that because of the school board's pivotal role in creating a system of segregated schools
which then prompted the accompanying stigma of racial inferiority, the school district must
not be absolved from its obligation to desegregate. Id
232. Id. at 646. The dissent conceded that the Court never intended "perpetual judicial
oversight" of formerly segregated school districts. Id. However, Justice Marshall contended
that precedent requires school system desegregation to be complete before lifting a desegrega-
tion decree to assure that the stigmatic harm identified in Brown I will not reemerge when the
decree is no longer imposed. Id at 646-47.
The dissent argued that the duration of federal judicial supervision is not a factor in assess-
ing a dissolution because if it is unclear whether the school board has fulfilled its obligations,
this ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the African American children. Id. at 647. Jus-
tice Marshall pointed out that the majority does not mention the burden of proof under its
standard for dissolution of a school desegregation decree. Id at 647 n. 10. However, Justice
Marshall asserted that in school desegregation cases, the presumption is against the school
board that has engaged in dejure segregation. Id (citing Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971)).
The dissent does not deny that courts must consider the value of local control, but this must
be considered in relation to the feasibility of the remedy rather than to the determination of
whether the constitutional violation has been remedied. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 647.
233. Id. at 648. Justice Marshall acknowledged that modifying the desegregation decree
may be appropriate in this case, but he maintained that the court had already ceased active
supervision of the Oklahoma City desegregation process in 1977. Id.
234. Id. at 647. Justice Marshall asserted that
[t]he injunction ... is 'permanent' only for the temporary period for which it may
last. It is justified only by the violence that induced it and only so long as it counter-
acts a continuing intimidation. Familiar equity procedure assures opportunity for
modifying or vacating an injunction when its continuance is no longer warranted.
Id. at 647 n. I1 (quoting Milk Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298
(1941)). See supra note 166.
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V. LOSING SIGHT OF THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, the majority concen-
trated on the limitation of federal judicial powers and, in the process, lost
sight of what desegregation is actually supposed to achieve.235 The major-
ity's remedy does not guarantee that a segregated school system will no
longer exist, especially when the remedy is examined in light of lower court
interpretations of Dowell's holding, a recent Supreme Court decision that
established a more flexible standard for the lifting of a federal court desegre-
gation decree, 236 and a later Supreme Court ruling that allowed a federal
court to incrementally or partially withdraw its supervision and control in a
school desegregation case.237 Justice Marshall's dissent, on the other hand,
focused on the purpose of desegregation as enunciated in prior desegregation
cases: to eliminate the message of racial inferiority.238 Justice Marshall re-
tained this aim first in formulating a standard for dissolution of a desegrega-
tion decree and second in applying that standard to the facts of Dowell.
A. Procedural Reasons for Rejecting the Dowell Decision
The majority opinion blatantly underestimated the consequences of a le-
gitimate state system in Oklahoma City that separated and stigmatized Afri-
235. Id. at 637. Although goals for school desegregation vary from case to case, the goal of
eradicating racial isolation and creating a racial balance is of primary importance. JENNIFER
L. HOCHSCHILD, THE NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SCHOOL DE-
SEGREGATION 44 (1984). Enhancing minority self-esteem, improving race relations, and in-
creasing minority students' opportunities, providing equal access to educational resources,
improving achievement of unsuccessful (most often minority) students, and encouraging sup-
port for desegregation are goals which would help attain a racial balance and eliminate racial
isolation. Id. Finally, since continuity in a school system must also be maintained, desegrega-
tion must seek to avoid "white flight" to private schools and mostly white public schools, to
minimize disorder in the community, and to prevent new forms of discrimination. Id. at 45.
In addressing a desegregation remedy, the majority in Dowell did not successfully balance
these goals with the need to exercise judicial restraint in a sensitive area of local control. See
Joseph Henry Bates, Note, Out of Focus: The Misapplication of Traditional Equitable Princi-
ples in the Nontraditional Arena of School Desegregation (A Case Study of Desegregation in
Little Rock, Arkansas), 44 VAND. L. REV. 1315, 1336 (1991).
236. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 763 (1992) (holding that
the inquiry for modification of an institutional reform consent decree is only whether there has
been a significant "change in fact or in law" and whether the modification is "suitably tailored
to the changed circumstance"); see also supra note 165.
237. See Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445-46 (1992) (ruling that if a school system
has complied with some aspects of a desegregation decree? a district court may give up its
supervision and control over those aspects, even if other aspects remain in noncompliance); see
also supra text accompanying note 66.
238. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 642. Contra BORK, supra note 44, at 75-77.
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can American people for sixty-five years.2 39 The Dowell Court failed to take
into account that this lengthy state-imposed segregated system has condi-
tioned people's attitudes, and that these attitudes are deeply ingrained.24 °
After only thirteen years of active court supervision of desegregation in
Dowell,2 "1 the majority's opinion that sufficient time has passed to eradicate
sixty-five years worth of effects of desegregation is questionable.24 2 Justice
Marshall's dissent correctly criticized the majority for suggesting that thir-
teen years of desegregation was enough.24 3
239. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 642. For a discussion of some of the indirect effects of school
segregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, see, e.g., Bates, supra note 235, at 1344-45 (explaining
that segregation has induced stagnating economic growth, increased movement of progressive
individuals from troubled areas, decreased movement of progressive men and women to Little
Rock, and also provoked public disturbance urging for a quick remedy). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has recognized the close link between segregation in housing and in schools.
Eric S. Stein, Attacking School Segregation Root and Branch, 99 YALE L.J. 2003, 2005 (1990).
See, e.g. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick (Penick I), 443 U.S. 449, 465 n. 13 (1979) (noting
that segregated schools contribute to segregated housing patterns); Keyes v. School Dist. No.
1, 413 U.S. 189, 201-02 (1973) (same); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971) ("People gravitate toward school facilities, just as schools are located in
response to the needs of people. The location of schools may thus influence the pattern of
residential development .... ").
240. Taylor, supra note 39, at 1724. "[E]xclusive judicial consideration of the school
board's behavior wrongly ignores the link between the school board and the broader political
system and community of which the board is only a part." Stein, supra note 239, at 2005
(footnote omitted). See Drew S. Days III, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: Why Isn't
Anybody Laughing?, 95 YALE L.J. 1737, 1742 (1986) (book review) (criticizing the Supreme
Court for recognizing only the school board and not other governmental entities as a source of
segregation). When segregation has been a continual community problem, it becomes con-
nected with, and less distinguishable from discrimination in society. Bates, supra note 235, at
1344. Plaintiffs, in addition to demonstrating unconstitutional school segregation, often prove
official housing discrimination at the same time. Stein, supra note 239, at 2013. See Little
Rock School Dist. v. Pulaski County Special School Dist. No. 1, 778 F.2d 404, 423-25 (8th
Cir. 1985) (finding public and private residential segregation with school board liability), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986).
241. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637.
242. Id. at 637-38; See Taylor, supra note 39, at 1724 (explaining that if active court super-
vision is cut short, the effects of segregation may not be fully eradicated). A desegregation
decree was not imposed on the Oklahoma City School Board until 1972, eighteen years after
the Court first found segregated schools unconstitutional. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639. Also,
judicial efforts to dissolve Oklahoma City's dual education system were not well-received. Id.
at 639. The district court concluded that "[t]his litigation has been frustratingly interminable,
not because of insuperable difficulties of implementation of the commands of the Supreme
Court... and the Constitution... but because of the unpardonable recalcitrance of the...
Board." Dowell v. Board of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Schools, 338 F. Supp. 1256, 1271
(W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972).
243. In 1972, the federal court imposed an injunction compelling the Oklahoma City
School Board to implement a school desegregation plan and the injunction was terminated in
1985. Dowell. 111 S. Ct. at 639.
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Affirmative remedies, especially those that have ended racial segregation
and provided opportunities for education and employment, have been called
the "principal legal engine of black progress."' 2 " These remedies enable the
once powerless to change their lives.245 By not enforcing an affirmative rem-
edy, the majority in Dowell failed to understand the effects of the "caste
system" 246 of racial segregation and failed to understand the need for a rem-
edy to prevent these effects from continuing after the end of formal segrega-
tive policies.24 7
The success of the Brown I decision depended on the legislative and execu-
tive branches of the government to further the policies that the decision es-
tablished.248  The Court became the catalyst that urged the nation to
acknowledge problems that previously it had ignored. 249  The Dowell
decision represents a total retrenchment from the idea of the Court as
catalyst.
250
244. See Taylor, supra note 39, at 1724.
245. Id. at 1734. "Victories in court were a kind of self-empowerment for black people that
led to other successful legal, political and community efforts. From these successes followed
heightened aspirations and increased confidence, confidence that was reinforced when people
discovered they had the inner resources to withstand attacks on their rights." Id. at 1709.
246. Id. at 1700-03. Although the opportunities that are available to most African Ameri-
can and white children are still far from equal, the "official caste system" that existed in the
United States for more than 200 years is no longer alive. Id. at 1701. The "official caste
system" refers to the treatment of African American people as an inferior class, primarily in
the South, through such things as legalized segregation in public institutions, the denial of the
right to vote, and the provision of lower quality public services. Id. Today, although there are
no longer outward manifestations of this caste system, "[flew recognize how deeply entrenched
were the roots of the system, not just in economic but in emotional terms, and at what cost in
blood and effort the elimination of the old order was purchased." Id. at 1702.
[S]egregation is itself the deepest educational harm because it is the result of institu-
tional racism and a condition of state-imposed racial caste .... With integrated
schools it is much more difficult to subordinate blacks as a group through unequal or
inadequate school resources .... With desegregation-and white children being reas-
signed to previously black schools-also come new resources.
Correspondence from Nathaniel R. Jones, General Counsel, NAACP Special Contribution
Fund, 86 YALE L.J. 378, 379-80 (1976).
247. Taylor, supra note 39, at 1734. The problem is that people fail to examine school
desegregation with a historical perspective. Id. at 1702. Consequently, they fail to take into
account the far-reaching effects of this system as well as the problems associated with eliminat-
ing these effects. See supra notes 221-23 and accompanying text, for an explanation of how the
dissent in Dowell incorporated an understanding of the need to eliminate the effects of segrega-
tion into its remedy.
248. Taylor, supra note 39, at 1731.
249. Id.
250. In Dowell, the Court ignored problems that exist in the area of school desegregation
by restricting federal judicial authority to intervene. See Board of Educ. of Okla. City v.
Dowell, III S. Ct. 630, 637-38 (1991).
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B. Future Impact of Dowell
It is precisely the disparate results of the Supreme Court in school deseg-
regation cases that clearly suggest that the dissent's reasoning is sound.
2 51
The objective in school desegregation cases is to give federal district courts
as well as school districts law they can follow in imposing desegregation
plans. Because of the inconsistent approaches the Court has used to achieve
its goals, it is not easy to predict what the Supreme Court will do in a partic-
ular case.
252
The majority is worried about a desegregation remedy that would last
longer than necessary, needlessly replacing the autonomy of local authority
with the supervision of the federal courts.2 53 However, the dangers of not
remedying segregation enough far exceed the inconveniences of imposing a
decree for an extended amount of time.254 If the Court allows some state-
imposed segregation to continue, the harm cannot be remedied.2"5 Some
minority children will be forced to learn in racially isolated classrooms. 256 If
251. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1499. See also supra notes 87-143 and accompany-
ing text.
252. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1499.
253. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 637. See also supra note 190.
254. Dowell, Ill S. Ct. at 648. A recent study shows the lasting impacts of school desegre-
gation policies and recommends that these policies deserve serious consideration. Gary Orfield
& Franklin Montfort, The Status of School Desegregation: The Next Generation, (forthcoming
1992) (executive summary at 3, on file with National School Boards Association and with
Catholic University Law Review). The study found that segregation has grown in cities that
implemented desegregation policies but did not change their surrounding suburbs. Id. (execu-
tive summary at 1). This "resegregation" has increasingly taken place in the Northeast and
Midwest, rather than in the South, where the problem of intense segregation for African
Americans was once centered. Id. (executive summary at 2). Now there is apprehension that
legal rulings removing the courts from desegregation contribute to a resegregation of areas,
including the South. Karen DeWitt, The Nation's Schools Learn a Fourth R: Resegregation,
N.Y. TiMEs, Jan. 19, 1992, at ES. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748,
758 (1992); see also supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
Dr. Orfield argues that increasing segregation by race brings with it increasing segregation
by income and also educational inequality. Orfield & Montfort, supra (executive summary at
2). However, neither politicians nor the public has made this escalating problem the subject of
wide discussion. DeWitt, supra at E5. Dr. Orfield fears that "[w]ithout such a debate, we're
headed for an increasingly segregated society which is divided between white and minority."
Orfield & Montfort, supra (executive summary at 2).
255. See Taylor, supra note 39, at 1722. African American children will be inflicted with
precisely the stigmatic harm that Brown I sought to prevent.
256. See id. at 1723. These classrooms are particularly detrimental to African American
children if they are endorsed by government authorities; contra, e.g., Larry Tye, US. Sounds
Retreat in School Integration; America's Schools / The New Segregation, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
5, 1992, at National / Foreign 1 (noting that some African American leaders believe that in
some cases, schools limited to African American boys may better meet the needs of inner-city
African Americans).
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the Court retains a desegregation remedy when it is no longer required, the
harm is not as serious and is also temporary. 2" A desegregation decree, as
the dissent points out, must remain in place only for the amount of time that
it serves its purpose.258 In addition, Justice Marshall noted that a court can
modify or vacate an injunction when its continuance is no longer needed. 259
Unfortunately, the majority's remedy does not do enough to assure the es-
tablishment of a system of unitary schools.2 °
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court established a more flexible stan-
dard for the modification of a consent decree, rejecting the use of the Swift
"grievous wrong" standard in institutional reform litigation.26' In Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Court acknowledged that Dowell had
rejected the use of the "grievous wrong" standard for the dissolution of a
desegregation decree, and extended that Court's reasoning to prison reform
litigation.262 Rufo held that if there was a "change in fact or in law" from
the time of the imposition of a consent decree and a showing that an adjust-
ment is "suitably tailored to the changed circumstance, 26 3 a district court
could modify a consent decree that mandated single-occupancy rooms in a
Massachusetts jail. 26
Approximately three months later, the Supreme Court in Freeman v.
Pitts 265 continued to lessen the existing legal safeguards against segregated
257. Taylor, supra note 39, at 1723. The harm likely to be inflicted in this situation would
be less serious in that parents' freedom to send their child to a racially imbalanced school will
be restricted. Id. Even if parents live in a segregated neighborhood, they cannot assure that
they will have this choice. Id. The harm is temporary in that if the duration of the remedy is
limited, then the harm which would stem from that remedy is lessened, if not eliminated. Id.
But see Wechsler, supra note 40; see BORK, supra note 44, at 79-80 ("IT]here should be a
presumption that individuals are free, and to justify coercion by government a case must be
made that overcomes that presumption. The burden of persuasion is upon those who would
regulate.") See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
258. Taylor, supra note 39, at 1723.
259. Id.
260. Board of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. 630, 647 n.l (1991) (quoting Milk
Wagon Drivers v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 298 (1941)). "[T]he injunction is
not a straightjacket; in all cases, the mandate to operate unitary schools will provide a frame-
work for administering an efficient system of public education in accord with constitutional
mandates." Terez, supra note 18, at 71.
261. Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758 (1992).
262. Id. at 758-59.
263. Id. at 763.
264. Id. at 759.
265. 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1435 (1992). Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the Court, in
which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White, Justice Scalia, and Justice Souter joined. Justice
Scalia and Justice Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice Blackmun also filed a concurring
opinion, in which Justices Stevens and O'Connor joined. Justice Thomas took no part in the
case. Id.
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schools when it held that a federal court can lift a school desegregation de-
cree in stages, before a school system has fully complied with the decree.2 66
Freeman established three factors for a court to follow when ordering partial
withdrawl from a desegregation decree: whether there has been compliance
with the decree; whether retaining judicial control is necessary to achieve
compliance with the decree; and whether the school district has demon-
strated its good faith commitment to the decree. 67 In addition, Freeman
held that a school district is not obligated to correct racial imbalance caused
by demographic factors after dejure segregation has been remedied.2 6' The
Court emphasized that its holding is consistent with the Court's duty to rem-
edy constitutional violations and to return schools to the control of local
authorities.2 69 The decisions in Rufo and Freeman indicate that state and
local officials will probably find it increasingly less difficult to change a fed-
eral court order that has demanded school integration in particular, or any
type of reform litigation in general.270
The one constant that lower courts have relied on in past desegregation
cases, however, has been the unwavering aim that the Court has always held
is controlling, the prevention of stigmatic injury to African American chil-
266. Id. at 1445-46. In Freeman, the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia found, in 1986, that the DeKalb County, Georgia public school system was
"unitary" with respect to four of the factors established in Green v. New Kent County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), used to measure the racial identifiability of schools: student assign-
ments, transportation, physical facilities, and extracurricular activities. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at
1442. The court ordered no further relief in those areas. Id. In the areas of faculty assign-
ments, resource allocation, and quality of education, however, the court retained supervisory
authority, since the school district was not in full compliance with the desegregation decree.
Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's
findings, Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d 1438 (1989), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1430 (1992), and the
Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed and remanded the case. Freeman, 112 S.
Ct. at 1436.
267. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. at 1446.
268. Id. at 1447. The district court found that the population changes that occurred in
DeKalb County were caused by independent factors rather than by the policies of the school
district. Id. The Supreme Court in Freeman allocated to the school district the burden of
showing that any racial imbalance is not traceable to the prior de jure segregation. Id.
269. Id at 1445.
270. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748, 758-59 (1992); see also
Ruth Marcus, Supreme Court Eases Rules on Prisons, WASH. PosT, Jan. 16, 1992, at A1; Paul
M. Barrett, High Court Rules Debtors Cannot Shrink Mortgages to Reflect Property Value Loss,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 1992, at A4. In reaction to Freeman v. Pitts, one commentator has noted
that "[w]e are now not only whittling down Brown v. Board of Education.... we are moving
back to the 'separate but equal' doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson (the controlling authority for
segregation in public education]." Nat Hentoff, Back to Separate but Equal, WASH. POST,
April 11, 1992, at A25 (quoting Kenneth Clark, New York City College psychology professor
whose psychological studies were cited in the Brown I opinion). See supra note 44.
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dren.27" ' The dissent's reasoning is effective because it recognizes that lower
courts must rely on the Court's enunciated aim of cases that it has heard in
order to determine the goal toward which the Court will work in a new
case.272 This is especially true since the approaches that the Court has used
to achieve its goals have been less than uniform.273
VI. CONCLUSION
In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, the United States
Supreme Court missed an opportunity to guide the lower courts in determin-
ing what constitutes an appropriate standard for dissolution of a desegrega-
tion remedy. Rather, the Court added to the difficulty the courts have in
interpreting the disparate results of prior desegregation cases. By construct-
ing a standard for dissolution of a decree without considering the stigmatic
injury of African American children, the Court ignored the purpose of the
desegregation precedents. As a result, lower courts have little to guide them
in determining what must be shown to demonstrate that a decree's purposes
have been fully realized. After Dowell, a court can decide that the purposes
of a desegregation decree have been achieved if a school district has com-
plied with a decree in the past and probably will comply with the decree in
the future, regardless if unenforced "vestiges" of segregation remain. For
these reasons, Dowell's ambiguous standard will result in disparate results in
future desegregation cases.
The Court should have decided the case consistently with desegregation
precedent and taken into account the stigmatic injury that both state-im-
posed segregation and the effects of segregation after the state has ceased to
enforce it inflict upon African American children. By failing to consider the
harm in the message of racial inferiority, the Court encourages an environ-
ment in which formerly segregated school systems, culturally conditioned by
many years of state-imposed segregation, may be allowed to silently slip
back to the tragic injustices of a dual school system.
Maria A. Perugini
271. TRIBE, supra note 39, § 16-19, at 1499.
272. See, e.g., Appeal of Little Rock School Dist., 949 F.2d 253, 258 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting
that "[i]n rejecting the Swift standard.... the [Dowell] Court did not indicate what showing
would be necessary for a party to demonstrate the need for modification [of a school desegrega-
tion plan]").
273. See supra notes 63-169 and accompanying text.
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